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International Relations in the Prison of Political Science 
 
Justin Rosenberg 
University of Sussex 
 
Abstract 
In recent decades, the discipline of International Relations has experienced both 
dramatic institutional growth and unprecedented intellectual enrichment. And yet, 
unlike neighbouring disciplines such as Geography, Sociology, History and Comparative Literature, it has still not generated any Ǯbig ideasǯ that have impacted 
across the human sciences. Why is this? And what can be done about it? This article provides an answer in three steps. First, it traces the problem to )Rǯs 
enduring definition as a subfield of Political Science. Second, it argues that IR 
should be re-grounded in its own disciplinary problematique: the consequences of 
(societal) multiplicity. And finally, it shows how this re-grounding unlocks the 
trans-disciplinary potential of IR. Specifically, Ǯuneven and combined developmentǯ 
provides an example of an IR Ǯbig ideaǯ that could travel to other disciplines: for by 
operationalizing the consequences of multiplicity, it reveals the causal and constitutive significance of Ǯthe internationalǯ for the social world as a whole. 
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Introduction 
The modern discipline of International Relations (IR) is nearly 100 years old. Its 
first Chair was established in 1919 at the then University College of Wales, 
Aberystwyth, and the coming centenary will doubtless witness a variety of 
celebratory events. There will be much to celebrate. In the decades since the end of 
the Cold War, public awareness of the importance of international affairs has 
dramatically increased. Courses in international studies have proliferated across 
the higher education sector. And the discipline of IR itself has opened up 
intellectually in a truly remarkable way. It has been transformed from a rather 
narrow study, heavily focused on Cold War military and diplomatic relations, into 
what sometimes looks like a universal discipline: a thriving intellectual hub where 
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ideas and approaches are imported from right across the social sciences and 
humanities, and where they meet each other in a rich and enriching cacophony of 
debate and innovation. 
 
Yet IR today is also experiencing a kind of crisis of intellectual confidence. In 2013, 
the editors of the European Journal of International Relations introduced a special issue on ǮThe End of )R Theory?ǯ by suggesting that the fundamental debates which shaped the discipline as a whole Ǯhave now subsided and… the discipline has moved intoǯ a period in which theory-building has largely been replaced by the 
much narrower activity of hypothesis testing.1 By contrast, Ole Waever has argued 
that IR today contains more theory than ever   – Ǯonly it is not IR theory!ǯ but rather 
theory imported from other disciplines.2 Christine Sylvester has analysed how all 
this theory is fragmented among numerous intellectual Ǯcampsǯ which see only by 
the light of their own campfires, and are no longer engaged in a shared 
conversation about their common subject matter. In this sense, she claims, it is indeed possible that Ǯ)R theory per se is at an endǯ.3  
 
If so, however, it is apparently not an end that will be particularly noticed 
elsewhere in the social sciences. For as Chris Brown has recently reminded us, the 
external impact of IR theory has been more or less negligible. While IR has indeed 
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imported numerous concepts, theories and methods from outside, Ǯthe exchange 
between our discipline and the rest of the social/human sciences is pretty much 
one-way, and not in our favourǯ.4 This fact that IR has produced no big ideas that 
have influenced other fields has often been lamented in the past.5 Today, however, )Rǯs credentials as an independent discipline are apparently so weak that in ʹͲͳͷ 
the Annual Review of Political Science actually published an article called ǮShould we leave behind the subfield of )nternational Relations?ǯ )n this article, the author pondered whether Ǯthe )R subfield should be abandoned and its pieces allocated to 
new subfields of conflict, institutions, political economy, and political behaviorǯ.6 
He eventually concluded that IR should be left for now, but mainly because 
breaking it up would result in new boundary problems among its several 
replacement disciplines. There was no suggestion that IR had a vital contribution 
of its own to make to the social sciences.  
 
What explains this peculiar situation? Why has the great flowering of IR as a field 
been unable to shake off this sense of failure and vulnerability? And what can be 
done about it?  
 
In this article, I seek to answer these questions in three main steps.  First, I suggest 
that at a deep level IR has never been established as a field in its own right. It 
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emerged as an extension of Politics or Political Science and has remained trapped within a borrowed ontology. ) call this confinement Ǯthe prison of Political Scienceǯ, 
and I believe it explains our failure to produce ideas that can travel to other 
disciplines.  
 
Yet this outcome, I then argue, was not a necessary one at all: no less than more 
established disciplines like Geography, History, Sociology and Comparative 
Literature, IR rests upon a fundamental fact about the social world which is full of 
implications for all the social sciences and humanities. This is the fact that the 
human world comprises a multiplicity of co-existing societies. Knowing how to take 
intellectual possession of this fact, how to extend it beyond a narrow argument 
about geopolitics, and how therefore to draw out its implications for other fields – 
this is the key to establishing IR in its own right, and to developing ideas that can 
speak to the other social sciences and humanities.  
 
Finally, I provide an example of one such idea – the idea of uneven and combined 
development – which is based precisely on this fact of societal multiplicity. As a 
result, it enables us to reinvent our understanding of the international itself, to 
reimagine the discipline outside the prison of Political Science, and to expand it in 
 6 
a way that enables the unique insights of IR to travel into the subject matter of 
other disciplines.  
 
1. The Prison of Political Science What then is Ǯthe prison of Political Scienceǯ? A powerful illustration can be seen in 
one of the founding texts of )nternational Relations: E( Carrǯs The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis.7 To be sure, this is a text whose foundational status needs to be treated 
critically. Its rhetorical structure – above all the claims it makes about the infancy 
of the discipline and the positions adopted by Carrǯs so-called Ǯutopianǯ opponents – has encouraged a highly questionable intellectual history to consolidate itself.8 
And yet it also remains the case that through this same rhetorical structure, Carr 
licensed himself to go back to first principles and make a foundational argument 
about the study of International Relations itself. What should be its starting point? 
How should we understand its subject matter theoretically? And where does it 
stand in relation to the wider social sciences? Carrǯs answers to these questions 
invite us to reflect on our own foundational assumptions – but they also enable us 
to see the prison of political science while it is still under construction.  
 
The section of The Twenty Years’ Crisis where this occurs begins in Chapter Seven, 
about a third of the way through the book. Up to this point, Carr has concentrated 
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on two preliminary steps. First, (in Chapters One and Two), he has set out his 
general argument about the formation of intellectual disciplines. They come into 
being, he says, in response to some urgent human purpose. And because this 
purpose precedes and shapes the new enquiry, it leads to an opening pre-scientific stage in which, as he puts it, Ǯthe element of wish or purpose is overwhelmingly 
strong, and the inclination to analyze facts and means weak or non-existentǯ. Only 
when the utopian schemes of this opening stage have failed is the new discipline 
forced to turn from aspiration to analysis. And the addition of a realist critique to the founding purpose of the study leads it out of Ǯits infantile and utopian periodǯ and establishes Ǯits claim to be regarded as a scienceǯ.9 
 
Second, (in Chapters Three to Six), Carr has applied this schema to the development of Ǯthe science of international politicsǯ. Founded in the aftermath of 
the First World War, the new science invoked the liberal doctrine of the harmony 
of interests in order to assert the possibility of constructing a peaceful world. The 
disastrous failure of its schemes for collective security revealed how far they were 
from being grounded in any adequate analysis of international politics. And the 
doctrine itself fell victim to a merciless realist critique which exposed it as the 
legitimating ideology of the status quo powers. 
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The scene is therefore set for Carr to turn to the constructive part of his argument, and to rebuild Ǯthe science of international politicsǯ from first principles. This is 
exactly what he now proceeds to do. And it looks at first as if he gets off to a flying start. ǮManǯ, he tells us in the opening sentence of Chapter Seven, Ǯhas always lived in groupsǯ.10 Let us remove the sexist formulation of the point by changing ǮManǯ to Ǯhumanityǯ. And it then appears that Carr has gone straight for that universal fact 
about the human world that must be the distinctive empirical and theoretical 
starting point for a discipline of International Relations: the co-existence of a 
multiplicity of social entities. Surely, if he now reflects systematically on this, he 
will uncover both the distinctiveness of this object of study and its significance for 
social existence in general. The disciplinary credentials of IR will be firmly 
established. 
 
But alas: as the reader soon discovers, this is not what happens next. When Carr 
talked about humans always having lived in groups, his use of the plural noun  - Ǯgroupsǯ – was almost incidental. He was not referring to the co-existence of 
multiple societies. What he was actually referencing was the fact that humans are 
fundamentally social animals who live together in groups. They do not exist as 
isolated individuals. And even this apparent positing of a general social ontology is 
actually just a means of getting to the foundational statement he really wants to 
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make, which is a statement about politics: because individual humans always exist in a social group of some kind, Ǯone of the functions of such a group has been to regulate relations between its membersǯ. And ǮPoliticsǯ, he then immediately adds, Ǯdeals with the behavior of [humans] in such organized permanent or semi-permanent groupsǯ.11 
 
From here, Carr goes on to add three further points. First, this behavior exhibits 
both a tendency to individual egoism and self-assertion and a capacity for co-
operation and sociability. Second, although political society, the state, is unique in 
being a compulsory association, it too exhibits this duality in the sense that it rests 
simultaneously on coercion and legitimacy. Both are essential to the nature of 
politics itself. And finally, this is no less true of international politics than of 
domestic politics. The Ǯinfancyǯ of Ǯthe science of international politicsǯ lies in the 
fact that it has not yet come to terms with this basic fact about its subject matter. 
Only when its initial utopian aspiration has been balanced by a heavy dose of 
realist analysis will this new field pass out of its infancy and become a social 
science like the others.  
 
Now, in one sense, it is hard to object to this chain of reasoning. After all, Carr calls this chapter ǮThe Nature of Politicsǯ. And his fundamental purpose is to emphasize 
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Aristotleǯs undeniable claim that because humans live in groups, there is an 
irreducibly political dimension to their existence. 
 
Nonetheless, something peculiar is happening here. According to the opening 
sentence of The Twenty Years’ Crisis, it is not the science of politics that is in its 
infancy, but the science of international politics. The purpose of the current 
chapter is to formulate the latterǯs deepest premises – the ones that will enable the 
development of this new science. And yet, although the opening sentence at first 
appeared to be a premise about the international condition, this has now turned 
out not to be the case. It takes only two further sentences for it to become clear that Carrǯs argumentation is about relations inside social groups rather than 
relations between them. And there it stays for the whole of the rest of this short 
but pivotal chapter until, right at the end, Carr proposes to apply to international 
politics what has been learned about the nature of politics per se.12 
 
And here lies the problem.  EH Carr is purportedly laying the foundations for a 
discipline of IR. But the way he proceeds is not to identify what premises of its own 
the international might uniquely contain. It is rather to extend the premises of 
Politics into the international sphere. And this procedure grounds IR in an 
ontology borrowed from Political Science. It is an ontology of political power 
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(operating in the absence of central authority) rather than an ontology of the 
international per se. Of course, Carr is not alone in this. It is hard to think of a single 
canonical work in IR which defines the discipline in other terms. To this day, most 
IR is taught in departments of Politics or Political Science. And in fact it is no part of the current argument to minimize the significance  of the Ǯanarchicalǯ nature of international relations. What then is so problematic about Carrǯs procedure? To 
find out, we must reflect briefly on the nature of academic disciplines. 
 
 
The Grounding of Disciplines 
 
The study of the human world is distributed across a range of social sciences and 
humanities. Scholars often lament the resultant fragmentation of social knowledge, 
with its tendency towards provincialism and reification. Ǯ[)]t should not be supposedǯ, warned C. Wright Mills, Ǯthat, faced with the great variety of social life, 
social scientists have rationally divided up the work at handǯ. For Eric Wolf, the creation of modern disciplines was a Ǯfateful… wrong turnǯ, while )mmanuel 
Wallerstein argued that the actual constellation of disciplines that emerged in the 
nineteenth century Ǯreflected very much the triumph of liberal ideologyǯ.13 We thus 
have every reason to be suspicious of academic disciplines. Nonetheless, the 
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division of labour they embody can bring benefits too. Whether by accident or 
design, each discipline foregrounds a particular dimension of social reality and 
makes it the object of an organized enquiry. It analyses both this dimension in 
itself and its significance for, and interconnection with, wider human affairs. As a 
result of this specialisation, the analysis may go much deeper than it would 
otherwise have done. 
 
In this way, for example, the discipline of Geography foregrounds the fact that both 
the human and the natural physical worlds exist in and across three-dimensional 
space. Human Geography studies the significance of spatial ordering for social life 
and the way that space is itself socially produced in different historical and cultural 
settings. It uses a focus on space to construct its analysis of the human world.14 As Robert Dodgshon once wrote, the special task of Geography is Ǯto show how 
interactions and processes, whether social, economic, political or ritualistic, are 
configured in space and how their configuration in space is intrinsic or prejudicial 
to their meaning and effect'.15 Thus, Geographyǯs very existence as an intellectual 
practice subtends on our existence in space. 
 
By contrast, the discipline of History might be thought to be so wide-ranging as to 
have no core ontological focus of this kind.16 But in fact all historical thinking 
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involves a conjugation of past, present and future in the production of knowledges, 
identities and agencies. It subtends on our existence in time – and from this 
connection arise both its practical and its meta-theoretical preoccupations with 
historical specificity, chronology, causal sequencing, and narrative forms of 
explanatory method. As Jo Guldi and David Armitage recently put it,  
 
[t]ime in all its dimensions is the special province of the historian… [)t is] 
something indispensible about the work of historians that is less central to the 
work of their fellow humanists and social scientists. Historians can never shake off 
the element of time. It clogs and drags our studies, but it also defines them. It is the 
soil through which we dig, the element from which history itself springs.17 
 
Time is thus to History what space is to Geography. In the wider conversation of the human disciplines, historians are the natural Ǯtheoreticians of temporalityǯ.18 
 
In a similar way too, Sociology is grounded in the fact that individual human lives 
are always carried on within wider structures of social relations that produce both 
aggregate systemic effects and local molecular definitions of human agents in specific ways. ǮSociologyǯ, says Anthony Giddens, Ǯis the study of human social life, 
groups and societiesǯ.19 )t is therefore no wonder that the Ǯagent-structure debateǯ 
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is perennial to this discipline. For Ǯthe idea of social structure is at the very heart of 
sociology as a scientific enterpriseǯ.20 
 
Finally, to take just one more example: Comparative Literature is the study of the 
different national traditions of creative writing – of poetry, novels, drama and so 
forth. But at a deeper level, it is surely also about language itself: how the 
metaphorical and metonymic properties of language are mobilized to create 
human meanings – and how, by extension, the social world at large, which is of 
course also linguistically mediated and produced, exhibits properties of textuality 
that invite hermeneutic deconstruction and analysis.  
 
In each of these four cases – Geography, History, Sociology and Comparative 
Literature – an academic discipline has arisen on the basis of a specific feature of 
social reality: spatiality, temporality, social structure and textuality. This 
specialized grounding certainly can produce fragmentation and even a kind of 
fetishizing of the feature in question. And yet, crucially, it is also the secret of the 
trans-disciplinary potential of these specialized discourses. Precisely because each 
has taken possession of something that is in fact general to the social world, their 
specialized investigations produce concepts that can suddenly travel and be 
applied right across the human sciences.  
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We see this happening again and again. In the 1980s and 1990s, Geographers like 
Derek Gregory, Doreen Massey and David Harvey used the spatial focus of their 
discipline to produce analyses of social change that grew into a spatial turn that 
was taken up in one discipline after another.21 Several decades earlier, Annales 
historians Fernand Braudel and Ernst Labrousse meditated upon the intersecting 
planes of temporality that come together to produce historical time. And they developed a concept of Ǯhistorical conjunctureǯ that has been used far beyond the discipline of (istory itself. )mmanuel Wallersteinǯs World Systems Theory has 
become such an enormous cross-disciplinary academic industry in its own right 
that we can easily forget that it began in Sociology as an answer to Sociologyǯs specialized question of Ǯwhat is a social systemǯ? More recently, literary theorists 
like Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak played a key role in the genesis 
of postcolonial theory which has gained traction far beyond the specialized 
discipline of Comparative Literature. In postcolonial studies, Comparative Literatureǯs specialized focus on language has made it a leading voice in the 
interdisciplinary conversation about the textuality of the social world.  
 
In all these cases, then, a given discipline can speak to other disciplines (and has 
something to say to them) precisely because it has specialized in a particular 
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feature of reality that is nonetheless general to the social world. (And this also 
explains why Ǯwe can… define each social science only by its core, not by fixing 
exact boundariesǯ.)22 
 The question therefore arises: what general feature of the social world is Ǯthe special provinceǯ ȋGuldi and ArmitageȌ of )R as an intellectual discipline? What is 
the unique focus that enables IR to speak to the other disciplines in our own 
language about their particular subject matter? If we ask this question of The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis, the answer is – nothing. IR emerges from its infancy not by 
finding its own voice and object but by accepting that it is simply an extension of another discipline, the Ǯscience of politicsǯ. Only when the same assumptions are 
accepted for international politics as have been since Aristotle recognized for 
politics per se – only then will the science of IR exist.  
 
And here we see the foundations of the prison being laid. After all, if IR is merely a 
subfield of Political Science, then the only identity available for it is a negative one: 
it studies politics but in the absence of central authority. Thus the international 
itself becomes associated with the narrow version of it provided by political 
realism. And once that has happened, the possibility of IR producing ideas that can 
travel to other disciplines seems to disappear. 
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Even the work of Kenneth Waltz, who certainly did assert the distinctiveness of the 
international, has two characteristics that prevent it from having transdisciplinary 
significance. First, Waltz defined international theory as international political 
theory: it emphatically did not embrace a wider condition of internationality with 
implications beyond Political Science. (And Waltz repeatedly challenged his critics 
to show how such an extension could be made without replacing theory with thick 
description.)23 Second, Waltz conceptualized the international as separate from, 
and counterposed to, the domestic realm. About that domestic social world, 
neorealism – quite literally – had nothing to say, except to note how different it 
was from the world of international politics that existed alongside it.24  
 (ere the peculiarity of )Rǯs disciplinary formation finds its extreme manifestation. On the one hand, the local impact of Waltzǯs work has been so great that one might almost suggest that for )R Ǯall theoretical development since ͳ9͹9 has been a series 
of footnotes on Waltzǯ.25. And yet on the other hand, Ǯhowever important Waltzǯs 
work is to us, it is at best vaguely recognized within Political Science in general, 
and pretty much unknown in the broader field of the human sciencesǯ.26 
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Of course, political realism has not had the field to itself in IR. Numerous other 
approaches have rejected both its narrow statist definition of the international and 
the idea of an autonomy of geopolitics. The sheer range of these alternatives – from 
liberalism, Marxism and feminism through to constructivism, post-structuralism, 
post-colonialism, queer theory and so on – accounts for much of the vibrancy of IR 
today. But how many of these challenges have themselves provided alternative, 
non-realist theories that are based on the unique properties of the international? 
The answer, it seems, is – none. 
 Liberalism and Marxism, for example, are overwhelmingly Ǯsecond imageǯ theories 
which argue that international phenomena are shaped by the historical form of the 
multiple societies involved.27 Poststructuralism, meanwhile, Ǯis not a model or theory of international relationsǯ at all; it is Ǯa critical attitude… [deriving from] an awareness of … other branches of the social sciences and humanitiesǯ.28 Constructivism too Ǯis not an )R theory but a metatheoryǯ.29 Even postcolonial 
theory reasons not from the fact of the international itself, but rather from the particular forms of domination associated with the Ǯrise of the Westǯ. Like feminismǯs critique of patriarchy, postcolonialismǯs critique of Eurocentrism 
makes an indispensible contribution to international studies. But neither feminism 
nor postcolonialism, nor any of the other theories just mentioned makes a 
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foundational claim for )Rǯs subject matter in the way that we earlier saw 
Geographers, Historians and Sociologists doing for theirs. 
 
Perhaps the reason for this is that they regard the idea of the international per se 
as part of the toxic legacy of realism – tainted, that is, by association with realist 
claims about conflict, power politics and the impossibility of progress. This is an 
understandable phobia, but it carries a heavy price. For it leads them to assume 
that international affairs must be shaped by other aspects of the social world, and 
are therefore best interpreted by ideas imported from the disciplines that study 
those aspects. Yet if we declare that Sociology, or History, or Anthropology holds the key to understanding )Rǯs subject matter, then we effectively turn IR into a subfield of Sociology, (istory or Anthropology. The downside to )Rǯs creative 
openness to the other disciplines is that if we have no deep ontology of our own, 
we become in effect everybody’s subfield. As Stanley Hoffmann once put it: ǮMost 
[other] fields have something to offer [us in IR]. But a flea market is not a disciplineǯ.30 
 
So perhaps we should not be surprised that no big ideas have travelled outwards 
from IR. Any such ideas would have to be about the unique importance of the 
international for the human world, just as the big ideas from other disciplines have 
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come from reflection on their core subject matter of space, time, social structure 
and textuality. But the realists have defined the international too narrowly for this 
role. And the anti-realists have steered clear of the uniqueness of the international 
because they associate it with realist claims about anarchy and power politics that 
they are determined to refute. The predicament in which we find ourselves has 
thus been the work of many hands – critical scholars as well as realists and 
neorealists. 
 ) call this situation Ǯthe prison of Political Scienceǯ for three main reasons. First, its 
ultimate source lies in the continuing failure of IR to break out of its original 
definition as a subfield of Political Science. (This subordinate identity will end only 
when we can produce a wider and deeper definition of the international that 
includes but is not limited to its political dimension.) Second, this failure confines 
IR within the premises of an alien discipline, preventing it from developing freely 
and realizing its own potential as a viewpoint on the social world. (Imagine a 
discipline of Geography that explored only the political constitution of space, and 
never the significance of spatiality for Ǯthe politicalǯ, or indeed for all the other 
aspects of the social world.) And finally, just like in a real prison, IR can receive 
visits but it cannot repay them. It can import ideas from outside, but it cannot send 
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anything back in return. Whatever significance the international holds for the 
wider social sciences, it never becomes visible. It remains locked inside the prison. 
 
Yet this not a necessary predicament. Just like Geography, History, Sociology and 
so on, IR has an ontology of its own, one with enormous significance for all the 
human sciences. This ontology is not the property of any one particular approach. 
It is our shared inheritance as a discipline. And it is our way out of the prison of 
Political Science. 
 
 
2. The Consequences of Multiplicity 
Let us return then to the big question: if Geography subtends on our existence in 
space; and if Sociology analyses the relational quality of human life; what general 
feature of the social world provides IR with its deepest ontological premise?  
 
The answer seems ineluctable: no matter how much we twist and turn it in our hands, the word Ǯinternationalǯ always ends up presupposing the same basic 
circumstance, namely that human existence is not unitary but multiple. It is 
distributed across numerous interacting societies. This is the elemental fact about 
the human world that justifies the existence of IR as an academic discipline. No 
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other discipline – not even Political Science31 – subtends fundamentally on this fact 
of societal multiplicity.  
 
Of course, as we shall note later on, all the social sciences and humanities 
encounter the results of this fact, just as IR encounters the significance of spatiality, 
textuality and so on in its own subject matter. In recent years, for example, cultural anthropologists have stressed the significance of Ǯprimitive warfareǯ, and other 
interactions in processes of early state-formation – an emphasis that necessarily 
presupposes multiplicity.32 Yet this does not change the fact that what 
distinguishes Anthropology among the human sciences is its analysis of human 
worlds through the prism of culture. Anthropology without interacting multiplicity 
would surely be bad Anthropology.33 Anthropology without Ǯcultureǯ, however, would no longer be Anthropology at all. For Ǯcultureǯ, as Clifford Geertz put it, is the concept Ǯaround which the whole discipline of Anthropology aroseǯ.34 In a similar way, the discipline of )R Ǯarises aroundǯ the fact of societal multiplicity in human 
life. This is uniquely our ontological premise.  
 
Still, this claim immediately raises two issues that must be addressed before we 
can continue.35 First, the idea of Ǯsocietiesǯ, ȋwhich implies tightly bounded, 
internally homogenous units), is a product of the modern era of nation-states, and 
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is often a misleading guide to reality even there. How then can it possibly cover all 
the different kinds of social existence that have obtained across world history? 
Well, as a description of the empirical form of that existence, it surely cannot. But 
that is not the work that it is called upon to do here. Paired with the concept of 
multiplicity, its purpose is rather to summarize the fact that social existence has 
always comprised multiple instances, whatever forms these have taken. In a 
different context, R.N. Berki once chastised Marx and Engels for not seeing that this 
fact has a force all of its own for social theory: )t does not matter, of course, whether one now calls it Ǯstateǯ, or Ǯnationǯ, or Ǯcommunityǯ or the Ǯadministration of thingsǯ ȋEngelsǯ renowned phrase from Anti-
Dühring), as long as what is meant is a plurality of these units.36 
 
And this point continues to hold if we turn our attention from the future (where 
Marx and Engels were looking) to the historical past. ǮIt does not matterǯ, for the 
general point at issue here, whether we are dealing with states, empires, tribes, 
clans or anything else Ǯas long as what is meant is a plurality of these unitsǯ. Thus 
when we refer to multiple societies, what we are actually invoking is not any given 
form of social existence, but rather the socially and politically fragmented 
character of human history itself. 
 
And this leads straight into the second issue: by granting this central importance to 
political multiplicity, are we not now re-grounding IR in the very ontology of 
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Political Science from which we are seeking to free it? If it is political fragmentation 
that makes the international, is not IR properly at home as a subfield of Political 
Science? The answer to this is twofold. On the one hand, political multiplicity must 
indeed have a special importance for IR – without it, there would be no plurality of 
units. On the other hand, in international relations the multiplicity of polities, as 
neorealism rightly says, radically impacts the nature of politics itself – hence, in Waltzǯs view, the whole need for a separate theory of international politics. 
Furthermore, where societal multiplicity obtains, its significance is not restricted 
to politics and relations of power. It extends into the social, economic, cultural, and 
developmental dimensions too; and its causal implications there, as we shall see 
below, proliferate beyond any logic deriving from political multiplicity alone. 
 
In the end, therefore, it is multiplicity, not politics, that provides the deepest code  
of the international as a feature of human existence. And this is why it cannot be 
contained in Political Science, or Sociology or Geography or any other pre-existing 
discipline. It demands a voice of its own.  
 
This voice has remarkable consequences for all the social sciences. Some of these 
consequences are half-known to us already; but we half-know them under the 
negative sign bequeathed to us by Political Science – the sign of the absence of 
 25 
overarching government. We do not yet know them under the positive sign of the 
international – the co-presence of multiple interacting societies. And when it comes 
to IR finding its own place among the disciplines, switching signs makes all the 
difference in the world. What, then, are these consequences?  
 
 
1. Co-existence 
 
The first and most profound one is also the simplest: at its highest level of 
organisation, the human world does not culminate in a single authority; but nor 
does it simply tail off into empty space; instead, it opens out into a lateral field of 
co-existing societies.  
 
This field of co-existence adds a whole new layer of social reality beyond the 
internal structures of any individual society. And the result is not simply that the 
human world is larger. It also contains a whole extra kind of social phenomena. For 
it is not politics alone that acquires special characteristics when it operates across multiple societies. ǮAs long as countries existǯ, writes Thomas Pugel, Ǯinternational 
economics will be a body of analysis distinct from the rest of economicsǯ.37 Ethical 
reasoning too has to adapt its premises when exploring moral obligations that 
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extend across multiple societies.38 And as we shall see further below, co-existence 
also adds an entirely additional branch of social causality to processes of historical 
development and change.   
 
In short, multiplicity generates the international itself as a dimension of the social 
world. And it is the special remit of IR to bring this dimension into focus and to 
construct it as an object of study. Let us therefore resist the negative definition 
inherited from Political Science, and state the matter in positive terms: the international is Ǯthat dimension of social reality which arises specifically from the 
co-existence within it of more than one societyǯ.39 
 
By contrast, to define the international as an absence of centralized rule only 
shows that reflection has begun, naturally enough, from inside one of the fragments of the social world. )t has not yet shaken off the Ǯdomestic analogyǯ which assumes that Ǯrealǯ social existence obtains only when enabled by 
superordinate authority. It is thus still exploring the international in terms of what 
it is not. In fact, however, we know from history that human societies have always 
been multiple – hence their multiplicity is no less definitive of the social world than 
is the existence of centralized authority inside them. 
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Moreover, all arguments from absence confront a fundamental problem of 
referential failure: the absence of central authority cannot itself be the cause of anything because, by definition, Ǯitǯ does not exist.40 Thus if we are to discharge our 
remit of bringing Ǯthe internationalǯ into focus, we need a language that is adequate 
to explore what does exist  - and that is the language of multiplicity. For this 
language alone equips us to derive the nature and characteristics of the 
international from the positive substance of the phenomenon – the co-presence of 
more than one society. 
 
Will this simply lead us back to realism? To find out, we must unpack the further 
consequences of multiplicity. 
 
 
2. Difference 
 
The quantitative multiplicity of societies is also a qualitative one. We know this to 
be the case empirically. We know that societies differ from each other in all kinds 
of ways – size, power, culture, history and so on. However, difference is also a 
necessary consequence of multiplicity itself. Why? 
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The reason is partly that multiple societies must vary in their geographical 
location. And they are therefore differently influenced both by the physical 
variation of the earth itself, and by the unique relational position that each 
occupies with respect to all the others. But difference also obtains because the 
distribution of social development across more than one society allows it to take 
different forms in different places at the same time. As we know, one of the most 
distinctive attributes of humans as a species is our ability to construct our social 
existence in radically different ways, and for those ways themselves to undergo historical development and change. Ǯ)n the endǯ, writes historical sociologist Tim Megarry, Ǯit is perhaps this fact of diversity which constitutes the most significant 
characteristic of human social organisationǯ.41 
 
Multiplicity, however, transforms this characteristic: from being simply a 
comparative fact about different societies in different times and places, it now also 
finds expression in a concrete configuration of societies that coexist in space and 
time. And in this way, the international inscribes difference and multi-linearity into 
the nature of global social development.  
 
 
3. Interaction 
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But multiplicity is not just about co-existence and difference. It also compels 
societies into interaction.  This is because it entails a common condition for all 
individual societies: they all confront the fact that the human world extends – both 
quantitatively and qualitatively – beyond themselves. As a result, multiplicity is a 
source both of dangers and of opportunities.  
 
It is a danger because events, decisions and processes occurring outside any given 
society can become threats to its interests or even survival.  During the Nineteenth 
Century, numerous Asian and African societies were overwhelmed because the 
industrial revolution elsewhere had transformed the power of other (European) 
societies whose very existence had barely been known to them before. In the early 
21st Century, the European Union experienced a political crisis due to the influx of 
refugees fleeing violent conflict occurring outside itself. 
 
But multiplicity is also an opportunity because co-existence and difference mean 
that the developmental possibilities of any given society are never defined 
exclusively by its internal social structure and cultural horizon. The existence of 
other societies creates the basis both for trade and for importing knowledge and 
resources produced by different patterns of development elsewhere. In fact, the 
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simple knowledge that other societies exist where social life is ordered in different ways, or where constraints that apply in oneǯs own society have been overcome, 
can become a source of domestic social change.  
 
Karl Marx once wrote that  
 
No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is 
sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never 
replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured 
within the framework of the old society.42 
 
Perhaps one could imagine some sense in which this statement holds. But if we 
take it to be a claim about social development as a historical process, then its 
neglect of multiplicity surely renders it misleading indeed. For on the one hand, the 
developmental potentials of existing social orders have all too often been 
interrupted and destroyed by external intrusions. And on the other hand, history is no less full of cases where Ǯnew superior relations of production… replace the older onesǯ, ȋeither by being introduced ready-made from the outside or by 
developing through interaction with other societies), without their conditions having Ǯmatured within the framework of the old societyǯ. 
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So multiplicity leads to interaction because societies have to manage their external 
environment through diplomatic and military means in order to survive; if they 
want to benefit from the opportunities of difference, they have to develop 
structures of interdependence too; and interaction also occurs, via the mutual 
awareness of other societies, in the consciousness (or imagination) of the ruled as 
well as the rulers. All modern societies experience all these things, all the time. 
This is international relations as mainstream IR theory knows it – geopolitics and 
interdependence. It comprises an immense field of social action – of inter-societal 
conflict, diplomacy, organization, law and exchanges of all kinds. But the 
implications of multiplicity do not stop here. 
 
 
4. Combination 
 
Interaction brings with it a fourth consequence: no society undergoes a history 
that is truly linear and self-enclosed. All societies must therefore be ongoing 
combinations of local patterns of development with external influences and 
pressures of all kinds.  
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This can apply even to their most apparently indigenous elements.  What could 
appear more English than the English language? And yet we know that it is actually 
a mixture of the Latin, Saxon, Norse, and French languages among others. And 
those different ingredients are not just linguistic effects: they are the 
sedimentation in language of the influence of the Romans, Saxons, Vikings and Normans on Britainǯs social and political history too. The point should be generalized: Ǯthe internal structure of society is everywhere conditioned, 
determined or even brought into existence by external factors, so that each society 
is linked to others, interdependent with them or even shaped by processes of 
societalization that cut across themǯ.43 
 
Thus the international dimension is not simply a matter of external relations: 
through interaction, multiplicity reaches into the inner constitution of societies 
themselves.  
 
 
 
5. Dialectical Change 
 
 33 
But this door swings both ways. If human societies are multiple, varied and 
interactive, then it also follows that the process of world development overall 
cannot be uni-linear or even just multi-linear. It must be a fully dialectical process – one in which exchanges among social formations unlock new possibilities and 
departures through mechanisms that are intrinsic to the phenomenon of 
interaction itself.  Let us consider a famous example.  
 
In 1620, Francis Bacon wrote that the modern world was marked off from the past 
by the impact of three key inventions: gunpowder, the printing press and the 
magnetic compass. Between them, he wrote, these inventions had done more than 
any empire or religion to lift Europe out of the darkness of the Middle Ages.  Bacon 
referred to them as Ǯmechanical discoveries [that were] unknown to the ancients, 
and of which the origin, though recent, is obscure and ingloriousǯ.44 In fact, 
however, all three of them had originated much earlier in China and had been 
transferred to Europe through processes of indirect trade and communication.45 
This is not just a general point about interconnection. Transposed out of their 
original Chinese environment, these inventions were now inserted into a different 
social setting; and they were therefore developed in new directions and with 
results that they never had in China. The same can be said of the transfer of 
classical Greek learning from the Arab world to Europe at the start of the 
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Renaissance – or indeed of the original translation of Greek philosophy into Arabic 
three hundred years before.46 In all three cases, the dialogical transfer of 
something out of one society into another set in train a new and different process 
of development that inflected the wider course of world development itself. 
Viewed in this wider frame, even the rise of the West turns out to have been rooted 
in a dialectical causality generated by the interactions of multiple societies.  
 
Co-existence, difference, interaction, combination, dialectics: what do these five 
consequences of multiplicity tell us about the subject matter of IR? They tell us that 
the international is something much larger than a subfield of Politics – or even 
Political Economy. It certainly does include the field of geopolitics and 
interdependence that Realist and liberal theories focus upon. But it also comprises 
the implications of societal multiplicity for all the so-called Ǯdomesticǯ aspects of 
social life too: social structures, economic systems, intellectual production, cultural 
phenomena and so on. And through this, Ǯthe internationalǯ imparts its own 
dialectical mechanisms and dynamics to the structure of world history too. To put 
it another way: a discipline of IR should certainly try to understand what happens 
in international politics; but it should also elaborate the significance of societal 
multiplicity for the social world as a whole. 
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This is our passport out of the Prison of Political Science. It means that we finally 
have something to say to other disciplines about their subject matter. Instead of 
talking only about the significance of class, gender, language and so on for IR, we 
can also explore the significance of the international for class, gender and language 
too. And we should not underestimate the contribution this can make across the 
human disciplines. One of the knottiest problems in the social sciences is what has been variously described as Ǯinternalismǯ, Ǯuni-linearityǯ and  Ǯmethodological nationalismǯ. )t is a problem that, as Robert Nisbet and Friedrich Tenbruck have 
argued, goes all the way back to the Classical Social Theorists themselves – 
including Marx, Weber and Durkheim.47 We see it in their tendency, at a deep 
theoretical level, to conceptualise society in the singular and in their failure, 
therefore, to theorise the consequences of multiplicity for social reality. From this 
intellectual source the problem is carried into contemporary theory where, as 
many writers – from Theda Skocpol (1973) to Zygmunt Bauman (1992) and Ulrich 
Beck (2007) – have observed, it continues to hamper social analysis.48 
 
Overcoming this problem, wrote Bauman in The Condition of Postmodernity, is Ǯa most urgent task facing sociologyǯ. Yet he quailed at the challenge: modeling the 
inter-societal space, he suggested, was harder Ǯthan anything the sociologists tried 
to grasp intellectually in the pastǯ.49 Really? Is it harder than the challenge faced by 
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Marx in constructing and solving the riddle of value as a social product – a challenge that had defeated even Aristotle, and that was Ǯnever even attempted by bourgeois economicsǯ.50 )s it harder than Max Weberǯs lonely journey into Ǯthe specific and peculiar rationalism of Western cultureǯ, a journey that fundamentally 
denaturalized the European Enlightenment itself?51 Or might it rather be that this 
sense of overwhelming difficulty is instead a reflection of the under-development 
of IR as a resource for the human disciplines? Societal multiplicity – and hence Ǯthe 
inter-societal spaceǯ – is the general feature of the social world that is specific to IR 
as a discipline. Yet if this feature has been defined negatively – the absence of 
unified authority – and has been locked up inside Political Science, then it is 
understandable how the international has been the missing piece of the jigsaw of 
the social sciences. If we now reground IR in its own ontology of multiplicity, that 
piece can finally be put into place.   
 Still, for that to happen, we need ideas that operationalize )Rǯs potential – ideas 
that make the international exportable to other disciplines by showing its 
importance for their subject matter. In principle, producing these ideas should not 
be difficult. We need only ask: what are the implications for politics, economics, 
culture, social change etc. of the fact that each of these activities occurs in a wider 
context of multiple societies?  Having already posed this question in the field of 
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politics, political realism ought to be able to play a leading role here – which makes 
it all the stranger it has not pursued this opportunity. Non-realist approaches are 
well-positioned too: they need only invert their existing procedures and explore 
the consequences of societal multiplicity for their chosen focus on class, gender, 
culture, language and so on. All in all, then, the pent-up potential of IR for the 
human sciences is surely enormous, and is by no means restricted to any single 
approach.52 And yet as we noted earlier, this potential is largely unrealized 
because so few IR scholars actually reason from the fact of the international to its 
implications for the social world in general. Nonetheless, there is one idea that has 
already been used to do just that: the theory of uneven and combined 
development.  How? And with what results? 
 
 
3. Uneven and Combined Development 
This theory was originally formulated outside IR, by Leon Trotsky at the start of 
the 20th century. But it works precisely by operationalizing the five consequences 
of multiplicity outlined above. This enabled Trotsky to overcome a major instance 
of uni-linear thinking in his day. And although the idea was subsequently neglected – not only by mainstream social science, but even by Trotskyǯs own followers – it 
has recently undergone a revival in IR: over 70 articles advocating, applying and 
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criticizing the idea have been published in the last decade.53 Let us first recall the 
basic elements of the theory, and then consider how it re-imagines the 
international in a way that carries its significance beyond the discipline of IR. 
 
At the start of the 20th century, Czarist Russia was undergoing rapid industrial 
development. But it was not retracing the experience of the Western countries as 
the Communist Manifesto implied it should. Marx and Engels had expected capitalism to create Ǯa world in its own imageǯ wherever it spread.54 But state-led 
industrialization in Russia was producing quite different social structures from 
those of Western Europe. And since the Russian Marxists drew their worldview 
from the Manifesto, they were increasingly left without a coherent political analysis 
and strategy. This was the problem that Trotsky solved by arguing that modern 
world development was not uni-linear but was rather multiple and interactive: 
uneven and combined. How did he do it? 
 
He began by invoking the first two consequences of multiplicity.  For what Trotsky meant by Ǯunevennessǯ was precisely that capitalism had emerged into a world of 
co-existing societies of different kinds and levels of development. Russia, he argued, Ǯstood not only geographically, but also socially and historicallyǯ between the 
industrializing capitalist societies in the West and the autocratic agrarian empires 
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to its South and East.55 Geopolitical co-existence and sociological difference were 
(and in fact always had been) essential features of its development. 
 
Next, he argued that in the modern period this unevenness suddenly produced a 
mixture of dangers and opportunities that intensified the third consequence of 
multiplicity: international interaction. On the one hand, the growing power of the industrial capitalist states imposed a geopolitical Ǯwhip of external necessityǯ onto 
all other societies: if they could not reproduce this new form of power inside 
themselves, they would be consumed by the European empires – as indeed most of 
them were. By the 1920s, only a handful of non-European societies had escaped 
outright colonial control by Western powers. On the other hand, this same 
historical unevenness gave these non-Western societies a paradoxical opportunity too which Trotsky called the Ǯprivilege of historic backwardnessǯ:56 starting 
industrialization later, they did not have to retrace the slow, haphazard 
development of the pioneers; they could import its latest technological, 
organisational and financial results from outside. And in this way, co-existence and 
difference among societies produced both pressures and opportunities that in turn 
created the possibility of accelerated development among late-comers such as 
Russia. 
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But it also meant – in line with the fourth consequence of multiplicity, namely 
combination – that these late-comers would not become copies of the pioneer 
societies. In Nineteenth Century Russia, the differential temporalities of West and 
East intersected; as a result, historical phenomena that had elsewhere succeeded 
each other in time were here rendered paradoxically contemporaneous; and this 
scrambled the causal co-ordinates of socio-political change. After all, Russian 
Czarism had no intention of transforming itself into a British-style constitutional 
monarchy. Czarism was importing foreign inventions and resources in order to 
shore up its own survival. The result was therefore not repetition but combination – or, as Trotsky called it, Ǯcombined developmentǯ. Elements of modern capitalist 
society were being grafted on to a semi-feudal social structure to produce a unique 
hybrid of the old and the new.  
 
What Trotsky was discovering here was the very phenomenon that Berki later 
accused Marx of missing: the impact of societal multiplicity on the process of 
capitalist world development. And he realized that as a result of this impact, the 
overall shape of that process was dialectically altering too.  
 Trotsky referred to this overall shape as the Ǯsocial structure of humanityǯ;57 and 
he argued that it did not comprise a homogeneous world of capitalist states that 
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were merely at different stages of a uniform development. Instead, East-West 
interactions had produced peculiar social structures in the catch-up societies, 
making them paradoxically closer to anti-capitalist revolution than were the 
advanced Western societies where Marx had expected the first revolutions to 
occur.  
 
In this way, the international – conceived as uneven and combined development – 
had dialectically transferred the trigger of world revolution away from the Western countries. This was an outcome that Marxǯs largely uni-linear theory 
could not have foreseen. But Trotskyǯs analysis now transformed it from a baffling 
contradiction into an enabling condition of political action. Viewed in isolation, Russiaǯs hybrid social structure, ȋwhich bizarrely combined a small but militant 
proletariat with a conservative peasant majority, a semi-feudal state and an all but 
non-existent capitalist bourgeoisie), was inexplicable in Marxist terms, and 
certainly provided no formula for socialist revolution. Once it was reinserted into 
its generative international context, however, all its Ǯpeculiaritiesǯ became 
immediately comprehensible. Moreover, from a political point of view, the key 
question was no longer whether a Russian revolution could itself create a socialist 
society – Trotsky never believed it could. The question was rather whether the 
internationally produced instability in Russia would turn out to be one part of a 
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wider, inter-societal logic of causation through which socialist revolution in the 
advanced countries would finally occur - whether it could function, in Trotskyǯs words, as Ǯa local avalanche in a universal social formationǯ.58 In this complex and 
many-sided vision, the international had been fully incorporated into a theory of 
social change – with truly radical consequences both politically and intellectually. 
 
One need not be a Trotskyist, or even a Marxist, to see the significance of this incorporation. The inner structure of Trotskyǯs idea is almost the exact inverse of E( Carrǯs in The Twenty Years’ Crisis. Carr argued from the nature of politics to the nature of the international. Trotskyǯs idea, by contrast, is all about how deeply the 
international can reshape the dynamics of political development. And because it 
inverts the direction of the analysis in this way, it looks like the kind of big idea 
that could be exported from IR into the other social sciences.  
 
 
The Grounding of IR in Uneven and Combined Development? 
 
Before considering this possibility directly, however, we have a loose end to tie up: 
have we actually shown that IR subtends on a truly general feature of the social 
world – as general as space, time, textuality and so on? After all, as mentioned 
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earlier, (and unlike space, time and even culture), the very existence of the nation-
state, let alone a global sovereign state system, is a very recent development in 
world history. How then can the international (conceived as societal multiplicity) 
be an equivalently general feature of social reality? Concerns like these have led 
most recent work on uneven and combined development to conclude that its object too is peculiarly modern: it is the result of capitalismǯs unique ability to draw all the worldǯs societies – whatever their prior histories – into a single 
structure of socio-economic and political relations.59 Some have even argued that 
any attempt to apply the idea more generally reduces it to triviality.60 If this criticism holds, it is not just Trotskyǯs idea that must be reined in; the claim for a 
discipline of IR grounded in the general fact of societal multiplicity would fail too. 
 
The solution to this conundrum comes, albeit impressionistically, from Trotsky himself. ǮUnevennessǯ, he says at one point, Ǯis the most general law of the historic processǯ.61 Trotsky never elaborated on this comment, but we can see what it 
means if we consider a snapshot of world development at any point in history. 
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Figure 1: The World, AD 1530, Atlas of World History, by John Haywood, (Sheriffs Lench: Sandcastle 
Books 2006),  4.01. 
Figure 1 reproduces a map of the world in 1530, showing the different kinds of 
society co-existing at the time. And as the pattern of different colours indicates, Ǯthe most generalǯ fact about this human world, viewed as a whole, really is its 
radical unevenness. It is in fact a tapestry in which several different kinds of 
human society, which had emerged at different points in history, are co-existing in 
real time. 
 
The brown and purple areas denote the great state-based power centres of the 
day, each of them based on a different regional civilization, having different 
histories, different cultural worldviews and different ways of organizing politics 
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and society. But the human world was not only composed of states and empires. 
Vast parts of it (in pink) were occupied by nomadic pastoralists – tribal societies in 
constant motion with the seasons, living off their herds of livestock. Other parts, 
(in light brown and green), were still covered by communities of settled farmers 
organized in family and tribal groupings of the kind that preceded the original 
emergence of state organisations. There were even large parts of the world (in 
yellow) that were still occupied only by hunter-gatherer groups. 
 
And of course these different societies were interacting with each other. The 
nomadic peoples of the Eurasian steppe-lands periodically erupted in great 
campaigns of conquest that could overwhelm the surrounding civilisations62 – a perennial Ǯwhip of external necessityǯ. When Marco Polo visited China in the ͳ͵th 
Century he found that it had been completely conquered by the Mongol nomads.  
 
There were also interactions among the civilisations of the time. We have already 
mentioned the transmission of inventions indirectly from China to Europe. By the 
time of this snapshot, Europe had also received a transmission of ancient Greek 
learning from the Arab world that helped stimulate the European Renaissance. 
And in 1530, the Europeans were conquering America and unlocking huge 
resources of silver and gold that would buy them into the Indian Ocean trade of 
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Asian societies that were still much wealthier than Europe. Hence, as is now well 
recognised, multiplicity and interaction played a key role in the rise of the West.63 
 Looking further back, we find that Trotskyǯs own society of Russia originated in a 
fusion between two completely different types of society. In the 10th century, a 
branch of the Scandinavian Vikings called the Rus settled into what is now  
Ukraine, in order to secure their trade with Constantinople, the capital of the 
Byzantine empire. It was from this relationship that Kiev, the first Russian state, 
was born, and from which it received the Cyrillic alphabet, the Greek Orthodox 
religion and the Byzantine code of commercial law. Kiev did not have to reinvent 
these artifacts of Byzantine civilisation – it received them ready-made through the 
privilege of historic backwardness. (The Cyrillic alphabet was deliberately 
invented as part of a Byzantine strategy to integrate the Slavic tribes under the 
regional hegemony of the Empire.)64 
  
In fact the importance of multiplicity and interaction goes all the way back to the 
very first civilization of which we have record. Ancient Sumer was built on a flood 
plain, which was ideally suited to agriculture but was completely lacking in the 
metals and timber and precious stones that became central to Sumerian city life. 
All these had to be imported through interaction with surrounding communities.65 
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Does it stop even there? Arguably, the prehistoric processes of social stratification 
that created the first state-like organizations were bound up with interactions (of 
violence and exchange) between settled communities and their neighbours.66 At 
the dawn of human history, uneven and combined development antecedes and partly generates the emergence of Ǯthe politicalǯ ȋand hence also Ǯthe geopoliticalǯȌ 
itself.67 
 
Why go back so far? What do all these examples tell us?  First, they tell us that 
Trotsky was right: uneven and combined development really is a universal in 
human history, and should therefore always have been part of our basic model of 
social reality. The snapshot of the human world in 1530 could have been taken at 
any other point in history. And while the nature, shape and configuration of societies would differ radically from one period to another, Ǯthe most general lawǯ 
of unevenness would always hold. 
 
Moreover, it would always have causal significance too. For these examples also 
show, secondly, that the Ǯwhip of external necessityǯ and the Ǯprivilege of historic 
backwardnessǯ are not just descriptors for the side effects of capitalism. They are 
general metaphors for the pressures and opportunities (cultural as well as 
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material) generated across history by the condition of (societal) multipicity. 
Through these effects of multiplicity, uneven development underlies two of the 
most elemental problematics in human affairs: the problematic of security and the 
problematic of cultural difference. 
 
And finally, what does all this show us about International Relations? Here we must be careful. We cannot say it shows that Ǯthe internationalǯ extends all the way 
back in history, because nations and nation-states are peculiarly modern 
phenomena. But the claim that needs to be made here is even larger than this. These examples show us what Ǯthe internationalǯ really is. )t is neither a byproduct 
of modern capitalism nor simply an absence of world government. It is the form 
taken today by a central feature of human history: namely the fact that social 
existence has been multiple and interactive right from the start. This is the 
perception that the Classical Social Theorists never built into their models of Ǯsocietyǯ. It is the ultimate warrant for a discipline of IR.68 And it finally reveals how 
IR can export its insights to other disciplines. 
 
After all, we do not need to look far to find truly striking instances of combined 
development in the world today. The largest, in every sense, is surely China, a 
country that endured a whip of external necessity so intense and prolonged that it 
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came to be called Ǯthe century of humiliationsǯ. Using the privilege of historic 
backwardness, Chinese industrialisation is now occurring on an even more 
accelerated, compressed scale than the other late developers before it. And like 
others before it, Chinese combined development is also producing a peculiar 
hybrid social formation. Capitalist industrialisation organised by a semi-feudal 
Czarist monarchy was peculiar enough; capitalism presided over by a communist 
state is surely the most peculiar, most paradoxical combination so far. But of 
course it is far from being the only one. In Saudi Arabia, a tribal system of politics 
has been grafted onto an industrializing society, so that the state, which owns the 
wealth of society, is itself the property of a 7000-strong extended family of princes. 
The forcing together of the old and the new does not come more extreme than this. And yet a significant fraction of the worldǯs energy supply rests on this peculiar 
political hybrid (and the events of 9/11 showed how just how unstable this hybrid 
could be). Meanwhile in Iran, a theocratic revolution that has no precedent in Shia 
Islam, let alone the textbooks of Western social theory, has been locked in a 
confrontation with the great powers over its use of advanced nuclear technology. ǲ)slamic Republicǳ – the very name announces the fusion of traditional and modern 
elements.69 
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Because we live with these examples every day, we forget how truly peculiar they 
are. Their existence could never be explained by internal development alone - 
international pressures and opportunities have created these hybrids and woven 
them into the social structure of humanity. They demonstrate the relevance of Trotskyǯs idea in contemporary social analysis.  
 
But they also do something else. They enable us finally to recalibrate the 
relationship  of IR to Political Science. For almost a century, political realists have 
effectively defined IR as a subfield of Political Science. It should be clear by now 
that this definition radically understates the scope and importance of our subject: 
the consequences of societal multiplicity extend across all the different fields of 
human action and thought. But among these different fields is of course the subject 
matter of Political Science itself. If it now transpires that the real-world political 
systems studied by Political Science have themselves been interactively produced, 
and if this is what explains their individual peculiarities,70 then it must follow that 
in this respect Political Science is a subfield of IR.71 
 
The point is worth savoring. But it should not be pressed in an imperialistic way. 
After all, the logic of our earlier argument about academic disciplines is that all 
disciplines are subfields of all the others with regard to the particular aspects of 
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social reality those others have made their own. All of them should be both 
importers and exporters of ideas. The anomaly of IR was that it was only an 
importer. And that was because it had not found an independent foundation of its 
own, but was imprisoned inside Political Science.  
 
Conclusion 
Let us end by pressing the argument one step further, using an example from 
Comparative Literature. Trotsky notes at one point that ǮRussian thought, like the 
Russian economy, developed under the direct pressure of the  higher thought and 
more developed economies of the West.ǯ72 That may sound like a mechanical formula; yet it need not be so. )t could be the first step in an extension of Ǯuneven and combined developmentǯ (and hence the scope of IR) from the social sciences to 
the humanities. There it could provide a framework for uncovering the 
international history of ideas and of cultural production in particular.  
 
A brilliant example of what this might mean has been provided by the Brazilian 
literary critic Roberto Schwarz.73 Schwarz analyses the rise of the Brazilian novel 
after national independence in 1822. He argues that this literary trajectory was 
part of a wider cultural process in which a new Brazilian intelligentsia was 
scrambling to assemble what were then seen as the accouterments of a modern 
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civilized society. Among the most prominent of these was the European realist 
novel, a literary form that gave expression to new kinds of private and public 
identity associated with bourgeois society. Brazil must therefore produce novels of 
its own. 
 
But there was a problem. Unlike England and France, 19th century Brazil was not a 
bourgeois society. On the contrary, it was based on aristocracy, clientelist Ǯfavourǯ 
and slavery. And this provided no basis for the plot-form of the European novel 
which explored the fate of socially-constructed individuals adrift in a 
depersonalized world of commercial relations. ǮThe social molecule composed of 
property and slavery, and poor dependents without rights, had a logic of its own 
that did not match the liberal coordinates to which the country officially aspiredǯ.74 
The result of this mismatch was a first generation of Brazilian novels that were 
necessarily superficial and inauthentic – not engaging with the reality of Brazilian 
society at all. The real history of the Brazilian novel began only later, when both 
the plot form and the narrative voice of the novel were redesigned.. Only then 
could they express both the different production of individuals in Brazil and the 
different inner meaning of European ideals when they were transplanted into 
Brazilian society. And the result was not just the creation of an authentic Brazilian 
literature. It was also a further development of the literary form of the novel itself, 
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which expanded its possibilities beyond the European originals that had been so 
slavishly copied at the start of the process:  
[W]hen this former colony became an independent nation, its peculiar and in many ways untenable morphology… imposed new tasks on European literary 
schools, that involuntarily altered them.75 
 
This example rediscovers in the sphere of cultural production exactly those 
consequences of multiplicity that lie at the heart of )Rǯs social ontology: the co-
existence and variation of multiple societies; the pressures and opportunities this 
creates that lead to interaction; the innovation of new forms which emerge from 
the process of hybridization; and finally the dialectical structure of the overall 
process itself.  
 
[I]n order to analyse a national peculiarity, sensed in everyday life, we have been 
driven to reflect on the colonial process, which was international. The constant 
interchange of liberalism and favour was the local and opaque effect of a planetary mechanism… Thus what we have described is the manner in which the movement 
of world history, in its cryptic and local results, repeated again and again, passes 
into writing, which it now determines from the inside – whether or not the writer 
knows or wills it. In other words, we have defined a vast and heterogeneous, but 
structured, field, which is a historical consequence, and can be an artistic origin.76 
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What Schwarz is mapping here is the invisible causality of the international as it is 
expressed through the uneven and combined development of the novel as a 
modern literary form. And in doing so, he both avoids the pitfalls of a uni-linear 
explanation and yet transcends the limits of a purely comparative analysis too. 
 
But what goes for the novel surely also goes for music, film, architecture – even 
clothing fashions and cookery. In fact, there is an international relations of just 
about everything, just as there is a spatiality and a sociology and a politics of 
everything. And that is because societal multiplicity, like spatiality, social structure 
and politics, is a general feature of the human social world.  
 
Applying uneven and combined development in these other fields will enable them 
to incorporate the international. But it will also enrich our conception of the 
international itself as we follow its causality into one area of life after another. In 
this sense, Schwarzǯs analysis of the ͳ9th Century Brazilian novel is as much a case study in international relations as is Mearsheimerǯs critique of Western policy in  
Ukraine.77 Both explore the consequences of societal multiplicity for a particular 
aspect of the human world.  
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As the centenary of IR approaches, is it surely time to leave behind the prison of 
Political Science. When we reflect on the consequences of multiplicity, we find that 
the foundations for a distinctive, independent discipline already exist. If we turn away from our Ǯcampfiresǯ and look outwards, we start to discover the enormous 
constitutive significance of the international for the social world in all its 
dimensions. As we piece together the different elements of this, IR surely can 
become a producer of big ideas for the social sciences and humanities. We may even stop talking about Ǯthe end of )R theoryǯ, and start talking about the beginning 
of IR theory. For we will realize that in reality it is only the pre-history of this 
discipline that has been ending. And if that is the case, then when the hundredth 
anniversary finally arrives, we will indeed have every reason to celebrate.   
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